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PREMARITAL SETTLEMENTS:
TILL DEATH DO US PART-DEFINING THE ENFORCEABILITY
OF THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
IN NORTH DAKOTA
In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997)
I. FACTS
Lavilla and Emanuel Lutz met in 1983 when he was almost sixty
and she was fifty-three. 1 In 1985, Lavilla moved into Emanuel's home,
and in 1987 they began to discuss marriage. 2 Emanuel informed Lavilla
that he wanted to leave the majority of his property to his children and
grandchildren and that Lavilla would need to sign a premarital agree-
ment before he would marry her.3 However, Emanuel told Lavilla that
there would be "something to take care of [her] anyway" and Lavilla
consequentially believed that he would do more than the premarital
agreement specified.4
Emanuel contacted his attorney to prepare a marriage agreement,
consents to wills, and wills for both himself and Lavilla.5 Emanuel and
Lavilla met with the attorney to discuss the documents and review a dis-
closure of Emanuel's financial information. 6 The premarital agreements
specified that Emanuel and Lavilla each waived any share in the other's
estate except for what was provided in their wills. 7 They both waived all
rights of dower, curtesy, community property, homestead, inheritance,
succession, surviving spouse or family allowance, exempt property,
claims for support, alimony, attorneys' fees, and costs of property settle-
1. In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90, 92 (N.D. 1997). Emanuel was recently widowed and
Lavilla was divorced. Brief for Appellees at 4, In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997) (No.
960177).
2. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92.
3. Id. During Emanuel's first marriage, he acquired a section of farmland in the Carson area,
and also two duplexes in Bismarck: three units for rental purposes and the remaining one in which he
lived. Brief for Appellees at 5, Lutz (No. 960177).
4. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92. Lavilla argued that Emanuel told several friends that he intended to
provide for her outside of what was established in the premarital agreement and that his plan was to
set aside investments from which Lavilla could supplement her social security and live comfortably,
and the principal would go to his children upon her death. Brief for Appellant at 6, Lutz (No. 960177).
However, Emanuel's children disputed the promise made to Lavilla by Emanuel that he would provide
for her outside of the premarital agreement. Brief for Appellees at 7, Lutz (No. 960177). Emanuel's
children argued that Emanuel never told Lavilla the source of the money promised, and as far as
Lavilla knew, he had not set up anything outside of the marriage agreement. Id. at 9.
5. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92.
6. Id.
7. Id. Emanuel bequeathed the farmland to the grandchildren, granting his children a life estate.
Brief for Appellees at 6, Lutz (No. 960177). The two duplexes were bequeathed to Emanuel's chil-
dren, with Lavilla to reside in one unit. Id. Lavilla also received a bank account, which was owned in
joint tenancy with Emanuel Lutz. Id.
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ment. 8 Emanuel's will gave Lavilla a life estate in their home, all of the
furniture, household items, other personal property connected with the
home and the family automobile. 9 Emanuel's will also had a residuary
clause, which provided that in the event that Lavilla did not survive him,
all of his property was to go to his two children.10 Lavilla and Emanuel
signed the premarital agreements and were married on February 14,
1988.11
In 1991, Emanuel began experiencing heart trouble which forced
Lavilla to provide extensive care for him. 12 In early 1994, Emanuel was
diagnosed with cancer. 13 Emanuel underwent cancer surgery in April
1994, and Lavilla cared for him until he was able to do minimal
self-care. 14 In August 1994, Emanuel was informed that his illness was
terminal.15 After receiving this news, Emanuel "begged Lavilla not to
move him into a nursing home."1 6 Lavilla then cared for Emanuel
night and day until he died on November 9, 1994.17
After Emanuel's death, Lavilla filed a petition against Emanuel's
estate as his surviving spouse for an elective share, homestead allowance,
exempt property entitlement, and family allowance. 18 "Lavilla argued
that the premarital agreement was involuntary [as] she did not have
independent legal counsel before [she] sign[ed], she was induced to sign
by constructive fraud," and that the agreement was unconscionable as it
was one-sided and harsh.19 Lavilla based this argument on the fact that
8. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92.
9. Id. at 92-93. Emanuel's gifts to Lavilla were designated under Article II of his will which
stated that if Lavilla did not survive him, "all property items bequeathed under this Article" should
become part of his residuary estate. Id.
10. Id. at 93. Emanuel's will named his two children as co-personal representatives, but his will
was silent as to the disposition of the residue of his estate should Lavilla survive him. Id.
11. Id. at 92.
12. Id. Lavilla's care included helping Emanuel bathe and dress himself, helping him to the bath-
room and to his chair, bringing him his meals and helping him eat, making sure he took his medication,
and taking him to the doctor. Brief for Appellant at 7, Lutz (No. 960177). Lavilla was also up every
night with Emanuel giving him his pain medication. Id. In addition, Lavilla aggravated a back injury
while caring for Emanuel, and she missed several physical therapy appointments to stay home and
care for him. Id.




17. Id. Lavilla's care encompassed her earlier tasks as well as getting up nearly every two hours
with Emanuel each night to give him his pain medication. Brief for Appellant at 9, Lutz (No. 960177).
However, Emanuel's children claim that Lavilla had help caring for Emanuel from relatives, hospice
volunteers, registered nurses, and home health aides. Brief for Appellees at 8, Lutz (No. 960177).
18. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 93.
19. Id. Lavilla argued that Emanuel's promise to take care of her "anyway" outside of the will
was constructive fraud as he failed to keep this promise. Brief for Appellant at 15, Lutz (No. 960177).
Lavilla also filed a creditor's claim against Emanuel's estate for her extraordinary services to
Emanuel while he was ill. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 93. The trial court denied this claim as it found no
express agreement to compensate Lavilla for her services. Id. Emanuel's children also petitioned the
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she did not consult with another attorney regarding the legal effect of
the agreement before signing any of the documents. 20 Lavilla claimed
that she believed that Emanuel's attorney was acting as counsel for both
of them.21 Emanuel's attorney denied that he acted as Lavilla's counsel
and argued that he advised her to seek independent legal represen-
tation.22 However, Emanuel's children, acting as co-personal representa-
tives, denied the claim, asserting that Lavilla had waived all of her rights
to Emanuel's estate when she signed the premarital agreements. 23 La-
villa then petitioned the trial court for compensation. 24 The children
moved for, and were granted, summary judgment.25 The trial court con-
cluded that the premarital agreements were legally enforceable, that
Lavilla had waived her rights to Emanuel's estate, and that the agree-
ments were not unconscionable. 26
On appeal, in a unanimous decision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that summary judgment was precluded as there were factual
questions to be determined regarding whether the premarital agreements
were executed voluntarily and whether they were procedurally and
substantively unconscionable in their application to Lavilla, thus possibly
rendering the agreements unenforceable. 27 In doing so, the court inter-
preted North Dakota's version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
for the first time.28
court for the distribution of the estate. Id. Lavilla objected, arguing that the residuary clause in
Emanuel's will was inoperative since it only took effect if she did not survive Emanuel. Id. The trial
court found the will ambiguous and approved the distribution of the estate relying on Lavilla's waiver
in the premarital agreement as evidence of Emanuel's intent to devise everything to his children and
grandchildren. Id. However, for the purposes of this law review article these issues will not be
discussed.
20. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92.
21. Id.
22. Id. Emanuel's children argued that in the deposition testimony, Emanuel's attorney advised
Lavilla that he could not represent her on the premarital agreement and consent to wills, and that she
should obtain separate counsel. Brief for Appellees at 7, Lutz (No. 960177). Lavilla argued that it was
never suggested to her, either verbally or in writing, that she should have her own attorney. Brief for
Appellant at 6, Lutz (No. 960177). Lavilla declared that there was further proof that she believed
Emanuel's attorney was acting as her attorney as she sought counsel from him about Emanuel's
promise to take care of her near the end of Emanuel's life. Id. at 20-22.




27. Id. at 99 , 101.
28. Id. at 90.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT
Since the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act in large part evolved
from state common law, it is important to understand how common law
states treat and enforce premarital agreements in order to understand the
provisions of the Act. 29 Prior to 1970, a premarital agreement that pro-
vided for the disposition of assets upon divorce was not enforceable in
the United States. 30 In a 1970 watershed decision, the Florida Supreme
Court held in Posner v. Posner,31 that "premarital agreements should no
longer be held to be void ab initio as 'contrary to public policy."' 32
Other courts and states began to follow this watershed decision, holding
that premarital agreements which determined property rights at divorce,
were not violative of public policy. 33
While the standards for enforcement of a premarital agreement vary
from state to state, the courts generally look at three criteria: 1) whether
the agreement was obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresen-
tation, or nondisclosure of material facts; 2) whether the agreement was
unconscionable when executed; and 3) whether the facts and circum-
29. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 127 (1993).
30. Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Premarital Agreements, 49
STAN. L. REV. 887, 897 (1996). See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Reil-
ing v. Reiling, 474 P.2d 327 (Or. 1970); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964);
Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 1950). Premarital agreements that contemplated divorce were
considered violative as to public policy since it was common state policy to protect the institution of
marriage, and courts upheld this policy by refusing to uphold premarital agreements that contemplated
divorce. Sarah Ann Smith, The Unique Agreements: Premarital and Marital Agreements, Their Im-
pact Upon Estate Planning and Proposed Solutions to Problems Arising at Death, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 833,
840 (1992). The common law rule was summarized by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Gant v.
Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 112 (W.Va. 1985) which stated:
The older rule was grounded in yesteryear's sound public policy: in general, 30 years
ago women did not work in the market economy; society enjoyed a consensus that
favored lifetime marriage and disfavored divorce; and prenuptial agreements that limited
the support obligation in favor of former wives encouraged divorce and made divorced
women potential charges of the state.
Id.
31. 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
32. Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970).
33. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE 1. L. & FEMINISM
229, 264-65 (1994). Brod articulates that since the Posner decision, courts have held that premarital
agreements settling property rights at divorce are enforceable and do not violate public policy. Id. at
265. It should be noted that since the courts have increased the enforceability of premarital agree-
ments, they have also shifted away from protecting the position of the female spouse. Marston, supra
note 30, at 898. As the court in Potter v. Collin opined, "No longer will the courts in viewing antenup-
tial contracts invariably begin with the realization that between persons in the prematrimonial state
there is a mystical, confidential relationship which anesthetizes the senses of the female partner." 321
So.2d 128, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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stances surrounding the agreement have changed since its execution,
thus making its enforcement unfair and unreasonable. 34 Premarital
agreements are held to the rules of contract, with the act of marriage
itself as consideration. 35
Under the common law approach, the courts look to the procedural
and substantive fairness of the premarital agreement to determine its
enforceability. 36 Procedural fairness is based upon two elements: 1)
voluntariness; and 2) knowledge. 37 The party asserting the premarital
agreement has the burden of proof so as to prevent "overreaching and
abuse" by the dominant spouse.38 Since prospective spouses are consid-
ered to have a confidential or fiduciary relationship, and to prevent the
dominant spouse from prevailing due to a superior position, they are
held to a higher standard of good faith and fair dealing. 39 However,
courts will generally find a premarital agreement enforceable if it was
made voluntarily and with full disclosure of all relevant facts pertaining
to the agreement. 40
To satisfy the first element of procedural fairness, voluntariness, the
courts examine whether either party was subject to duress, undue influ-
ence, or fraud. 41 Courts also examine whether the parties had indepen-
34. Ronald S. Ladden & Robert J. Franco, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: An Ill-
Reasoned Retreat from the Unconscionability Analysis, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 267, 270 (1990).
35. Marston, supra note 30, at 898. See also Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Haw. 1988)
(determining that premarital agreements are governed by the laws of contract and that "the basic test
is whether ... the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under 'the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract... The principle is one of the prevention of oppres-
sion and unfair surprise.") The premarital agreement in this case was executed prior to THE Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act and thus was not governed by it.
36. Marston, supra note 30, at 898. Procedural fairness has been described as "whether the par-
ties negotiated and executed the agreement voluntarily, and knew the nature and value of the rights
affected by the agreement"; and substantive fairness as "whether the terms of the agreement fail to
meet some standard of substantive sufficiency, so that the agreement's provisions are either unfair or
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable." Brod, supra note 33, at 254.
37. Brod, supra note 33, at 255. See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 265-66
(Minn. 1989) (determining that the procedural fairness requirement is met when the parties voluntarily
contract after full financial disclosure). The court stated that procedural review focuses on whether,
at the inception, the agreement was fairly procured, requiring full disclosure and access to advice
from independent counsel; and substantive review focuses on fairness, reasonableness, or
conscionability of the agreement. Id.
38. Ladden & Franco, supra note 34, at 270.
39. Brod, supra note 33, at 256. See also Ladden & Franco, supra note 34, at 270 (stating that the
courts recognize that there is a danger that the more dominant of the parties will prevail due to a
superior position in the relationship). One court has stated that "candor compels us to raise to a
conscious level the fact that, as in this case, prenuptial agreements will almost always be entered into
between people with property or an income potential to protect on one side and people who are
impecunious on the other." Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114 (W.Va. 1985).
40. Brod, supra note 33, at 256.
41. Id. See, e.g., Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (I11. App. Ct. 1972) (stating that public policy
was not violated by permitting persons, prior to marriage, to establish their rights by contract as long as
the contract is entered into with full knowledge and without fraud, duress, or coercion); DeLorean v.
DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (requiring that there is no fraud or
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dent legal representation, often deeming this to be the best evidence that
the agreement was entered into voluntarily. 42 The second element in
determining procedural fairness is whether the parties had knowledge of
the extent and value of the rights affected by the premarital agreement.4 3
This requirement seemingly hinges on whether the proponent of the
agreement disclosed financial information prior to the signing of the
agreement. 44 Again, courts look to see if each party had access to
independent legal counsel to determine whether an agreement was made
knowingly.45
After deciding whether a premarital agreement is procedurally fair,
the courts determine whether it is substantively fair.46 In assessing the
agreement's substantive fairness, courts examine whether it is "reason-
able in the circumstances," "fair and equitable," "fair and reasonable
at the time of the making of the agreement," and "not unconscionable
at the time of judgment." 47 Many courts examine a premarital agree-
ment for substantive fairness at its execution, thereby favoring the par-
ties' freedom to contract. 48 However, under the common law approach,
duress in the execution of the agreement or that it is entered into voluntarily); Gross v. Gross, 464
N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984) (holding that premarital agreements are valid and enforceable if three
conditions are met: one, if they have been entered into without fraud, duress, coercion or overreach-
ing; two, if there was full disclosure and understanding of the value and extent of the prospective
spouse's property; and three, if the terms did not promote divorce).
42. Judith Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1075
(1988). See, e.g., DeLorean, 511 A.2d at 1259 (acknowledging that while the wife did not have inde-
pendent counsel of her own choosing, she consulted with an attorney before signing the agreement,
the attorney advised her not to sign, and yet she rejected that advice and signed the agreement); Gross,
464 N.E.2d at 510 (ruling that even though the wife had independent counsel who advised her not to
sign the agreement, the wife was not bound by the provisions of the alimony as the court found the pro-
vision unconscionable because it would require the wife to "return from this opulent standard of
living" to something far less which could be deemed a hardship); Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 116 (stating that
"such independent advice is not a prerequisite to enforceability when the terms of the agreement are
utiderstandable to a reasonably intelligent adult, as long as both parties had the opportunity to consult
with independent counsel").
43. Brod, supra note 33, at 257.
44. Id. While states vary in their requirements as to knowledge, it is generally held that the par-
ties must not only know but also understand the nature of the rights affected by the agreement. Id. at
258-59. States also vary in the specifics of what information must be disclosed. Id. While almost all
courts require that there has been adequate financial disclosure, this can be challenged if the parties
had independent knowledge of the other's financial circumstances. Id. See also Potter v. Collin, 321
So.2d 128, 132 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the premarital agreement was valid, even though
it may have been imprudent, as there had been a full disclosure of the other spouse's assets).
45. Brod, supra note 33, at 259. See also Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 817-18 (Tenn.
1996) (finding a premarital agreement invalid where there had not been a full disclosure of assets and
the other party was not represented by counsel). But see Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165-66
(Pa. 1990) (holding that a premarital agreement was valid and enforceable even though there was a
question as to whether the wife fully understood the terms of the agreement and had not obtained legal
counsel. The court determined that premarital agreements are contracts and should be evaluated and
treated as such).
46. Brod, supra note 33, at 259. A far more divergent view exists among the states regarding the
definition and application of substantive fairness than exists for procedural fairness. Id.
47. Younger, supra note 42, at 1081.
48. Brod, supra note 33, at 262. This provides a higher degree of predictability for enforcement
since the parties will know from the beginning of the marriage how the agreement is to be tested. Id.
416
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courts are free to evaluate the agreement at the time of dissolution.
49 Pre-
marital agreements which leave a spouse unable to provide for them-
selves, drastically reduces their standard of living, forces them to become
a public charge, or are otherwise unconscionable, are not enforced.50
Thus, under the common law approach, most states have adhered to the
modern approach of enforcing a premarital agreement using procedural
and substantive unconscionability.51
B. UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
In 1983, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
(U.P.A.A.).52 The purpose of this uniform Act is to provide a model stat-
ute governing premarital agreements that offers states uniformity regard-
ing the enforceability of premarital agreements. 53 The Act encompasses
However, this also makes it more difficult to mitigate an unforeseen and unfair outcome, especially
where there are changed financial circumstances. See Younger, supra note 42, at 1082. An impor-
tant element of the unconscionability analysis is whether the fairness of the agreement was considered
at the time of the agreement or the time of enforcement. See Ladden & Franco, supra note 34, at 271.
49. Ladden & Franco, supra note 34, at 272. See also McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d
259, 267 (Minn. 1989) (stating that by having a substantive review, the court may be able to relieve
some parties from contract provisions that may have been procedurally and substantively fair at the
time of execution, but have now become unconscionable and unfair at the time of enforcement).
50. Younger, supra note 42, at 1082-83. See also Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 510 (Ohio
1984) (holding that the maintenance agreed to in the premarital agreement was invalid as the hus-
band's assets grew considerably during their fourteen year marriage and to so drastically reduce the
wife's standard of living was unconscionable). But see Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 736
(Colo. 1982) (holding that the minimal maintenance the wife agreed to in the premarital agreement
was enforceable even though husband was "a man of considerable means," although the court stated
that the maintenance provision of a premarital agreement may be voidable for unconscionability due
to circumstances at the time of the marriage dissolution).
51. Brod, supra note 33, at 262.
52. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §§ 1-12, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987 & Supp. 1997). Presently
26 states have adopted the Act: Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-201 to -205 (1991)); Arkansas (ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-401 to -413 (Michie 1993)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600 to 1617 (West
1994)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-36a to -36j (1995)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§
321-328 (Supp. 1996); DISTRICT of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-141 to -150 (1993)); Hawaii
(HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 572D-1 to -11 (1993)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 32-921 to -929 (1996)); Illinois
(750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to /11 (1993)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-2.5-1 to -10 (Michie
1997)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 596.1-.12 (West 1996)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-801 to
-811 (1995)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 601 to 611 (West 1981)); Montana (Mont.
Code Ann. §§ 40-2-601 to -610 (1996)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1001 to -1011
(Michie 1993)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123A.010-.100 (1993)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
37:2-31 to -41 (West 1968)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1 to -10 (Michie 1978)); North
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52B-1 to -11 (1996)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03.1-01 to
-09 (1991)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 108.700-.740 (1995)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
15-17-1 to -11 (1996)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-2-16 to -25 (Michie 1992)); Texas
(TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.41-.56 (West 1993)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-8-1 to -9 (1995));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -155 (Michie 1995)).
53. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 369. The drafters of the
Act in explaining the motivation behind the statute stated:
The number of marriages between persons previously married and the number of
marriages between persons each of whom is intending to continue to pursue a career is
steadily increasing. For these and other reasons, it is becoming more and more common
for persons contemplating marriage to seek to resolve by agreement certain issues
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEW [VOL. 74:411
several aspects of an agreement, including the formalities of the agree-
ment, 54 the content of the agreement, 55 the effectiveness of the mar-
riage,56 the amendments and revocation, 57 the enforcement of the agree-
ment if the marriage is void,58 and the timeliness of an action to enforce
an agreement. 59 The U.P.A.A. was enacted with the intention that it
would be limited in its scope.60
Section 1 of the U.P.A.A. sets forth how the Act is to be defined.61
"Premarital agreement" is defined as and limited to, "an agreement be-
tween prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be
effective upon marriage." 62 "Property" is defined as "an interest, pres-
ent or future, legal or equitable, vested or contingent, in real or personal
property, including income and earnings." 63 Agreements made between
individuals who are living together but not contemplating marriage, and
postnuptial or separation agreements are not covered under the Act. 64
The U.P.A.A. also does not govern premarital agreements retro-
actively.65
Section 2 of the U.P.A.A. restates the common law requirement that
the agreement be put into writing and signed by both parties, thereby
subjecting it to the Statute of Frauds.66 Section 2 also restates what is an
presented by the forthcoming marriage. However, despite a lengthy legal history of
these premarital agreements, there is a substantial uncertainty as to the enforcement of
all, or a portion, of the provisions of these agreements and a significant lack of
uniformity of treatment of these agreements among the states. The problems caused by
this uncertainty and nonuniformity are greatly exacerbated by the mobility of our
population. Nevertheless, this uncertainty and nonuniformity seem reflective not so
much of basic policy differences between the states but rather a result of a spasmodic,
reflexive response to varying factual circumstances at different times. Accordingly,
uniform legislation conforming to modem social policy which provides both certainty and
sufficient flexibility to accommodate different circumstances would appear to be both a
significant improvement and a goal realistically capable of achievement.
Id.
54. Id. § 2, 9B U.L.A. at 372.
55. Id. § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 373.
56. Id. § 4, 9B U.L.A. at 375.
57. Id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. at 375.
58. Id. § 7, 9B U.L.A. at 378.
59. Id. § 8, 9B U.L.A. at 379.
60. Id., Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 369.
61. See id. § 1, 9B U.L.A. at 371.
62. Id. The language in this section is significant because it excludes postnuptial agreements
from the scope of the Act. Id.
63. Id. § 1(2), 9B U.L.A. at 371. Designed to embrace all forms of property and interests, includ-
ed in this subsection are "rights in a professional license or practice, employee benefit plans, pension
and retirement accounts, and so on. The reference to income or earnings includes both income from
property and earnings from personal services." Id. § 1(2) cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 371.
64. Id. § 1 cmt. 9B U.L.A. at 372. The NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE, in its introductory materi-
al, varies from the official text by stating in its definition that "[a] person has 'notice' of a fact if the
person has knowledge of it, receives a notification of it, or has reason to know it exists from the facts
and circumstances known to the person." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-01 (1998).
65. See Prevatte v. Prevatte, 411 S.E.2d 386, 389 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. (1991).
66. UNEF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 2 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 372. See also Hall v. Hall, 271
Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (determining that the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act is
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1998] CASE COMMENT 419
almost universal rule, that the marriage itself is consideration for a
premarital agreement. 67 Lastly, this section states that a premarital
agreement is a contract, and like any other contract, the parties must have
the capacity to contract in order to enter into the agreement. 68
Section 3 governs the content of the premarital agreement and the
respects in which parties may contract. 69 This section intends for the
matters listed to be illustrative and not exclusive. 70 Section 3 broadly
describes the subject matter of premarital agreements, with modification
or elimination of spousal support, rights and obligations with regard to
property, and the disposition of property upon separation or divorce as
a statute of frauds and requires agreements to be in writing in order to be enforceable). However, the
court also implied that an oral agreement may be enforceable by promissory estoppel principles, since
the Act does not affect enforcement alternatives. Id. North Dakota's version of the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act substitutes the words "must be a document and signed" for "must be in
writing and signed." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-02 (1998).
67. UNIF. PREMARITAL A CREEMENT ACT § 2 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 372. The primary importance of
this rule is to require a degree of mutuality of benefits to support the enforceability of the agreement
and also to ensure a ceremonial marriage. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id § 3, 9B U.L.A. At 373. Section three states:
(a) Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:
(1) the rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either
or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;
(2) the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend,
assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or
otherwise manage and control property;
(3) the disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
(4) the modification or elimination of spousal support;
(5) the making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions
of the agreement;
(6) the ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance
policy;
(7) the choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and
(8) any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
(b) The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital
agreement.
Id.
70. Id. cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 374. While subsections (a)(l) through (a)(7) discuss what are permis-
sible subjects of premarital agreements, subsection (a)(8) appears to be an expansion of the common
law. Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy:
The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1037, 1052 (1993). Subsection (a)(8) contemplates that parties may contract regarding matters
unrelated to property and support, such as "living arrangements, choice of domicile, and domestic
services." Id. Subsection (a)(8) authorizes parties to contract an agreement providing "for such mat-
ters as the choice of abode, the freedom to pursue career opportunities, the upbringing of children,"
and so on. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 374. It is important to note that
this section clearly states that an agreement may not "adversely affect" the right of a child to support.
Id.
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examples. 7 1 The principles of construction that apply to contracts are
also applicable to premarital agreements. 72
Section 4 reflects Section 2 in stating that marriage is a prerequisite
for the effectiveness of a premarital agreement. 73 This section does not
govern a situation where the parties live together outside of marriage
and, in that instance, the parties must look to other law in the juris-
diction. 74 Section 5 determines when a premarital agreement can be
amended or revoked. 75 This section states that after marriage, an agree-
ment may only be amended or revoked by a written agreement signed
by the parties and that this agreement is enforceable without consider-
ation.76
Undoubtedly, the most important provision in the Act is Section 6,
which governs the enforceability of an agreement. 77 Section 6 is consid-
71. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 373. Some states that have adopted
the Act have either altered or refused to authorize agreements that modify or eliminate spousal
support. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.5(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (substituting the words
"spouse or child" for "child" in regard to the right that support may not be adversely affected by a
premarital agreement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-4(B) (Michie 1997) (omitting the modification or
elimination of a spousal support section and including a section that states "[a] premarital agreement
may not adversely affect the right of a child or spouse to support."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-18
(Michie 1992) (omitting the section that modifies or eliminates spousal support).
72. Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 614-15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
73. UN'I. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 4 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 375.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. at 375.
76. Id. Section five requires the same formalities for the original execution of the agreement as
for amending or revoking the agreement. Id. § 5 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 375. See also Hurt v. Hurt, 433
S.E.2d 493, 497 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (determining that where the husband called off the wedding two
days before the scheduled date, and the parties resumed the relationship and were married months
later, the premarital agreement was repudiated and unenforceable, even though the husband claimed
the marriage created an enforceable premarital agreement and that there was no requirement of an
express time period to get married). Section five diverges from the common law approach where the
parties may demonstrate an intent to revoke their premarital agreement through specific conduct. See
Atwood, supra note 29, at 147.
77. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6, 9B U.L.A. at 376. Section six states:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement
is sought proves that:
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution
of the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of
the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure
provided; and
(iii)did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of
the property or financial obligations of the other party.
(b) If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and
that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the
other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the
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ered the "key operative section of the Act" since it sets forth the
conditions that determine whether an agreement is enforceable. 7
8
Under subsection 6(a), a party may escape enforcement of a pre-
marital agreement by proving that he or she did not execute the agree-
ment voluntarily, or that the agreement was unconscionable when
executed. 79 However, to avoid enforcement under unconscionability, a
party must prove that they were not provided fair and reasonable disclo-
sure, did not voluntarily waive any right to disclosure, and did not
reasonably have adequate knowledge of the other's property or
obligations. 80 Nevertheless, if the conditions of subsection 6(a) are not
met, the Act provides the challenging party an additional option to avoid
enforcement of an agreement that modifies or eliminates spousal
support.8 ' Under subsection 6(b), if the premarital agreement "causes
one party to the agreement to be 'eligible for support under a program
of public assistance"' at the time of separation or divorce, a court may
require the other party to provide support to the extent that it is neces-
sary to avoid that eligibility.82
Section 6 also places the burden of proof upon the party challeng-
ing the agreement in all situations. 83 While pre-U.P.A.A. courts some-
times effectuated a burden shift in certain situations, the U.P.A.A.
contains no provision for burden shifting, thus making it more difficult
to attack the validity of an agreement.84
court as a matter of law.
Id.
North Dakota's version of section six of the Act varies in subsection (a)(2)(ii) by substituting
"voluntarily sign a document expressly waiving any right" for "voluntarily and expressly waive, in
writing, any right." See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(i)(b)(2) (1997).
78. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 369.
79. Id. It should be noted that section six mandates that the court determine the unconscionability
of the agreement by examining the circumstances at the time of execution of the agreement, rather
than at the time of enforcement. See Brod, supra note 33, at 277. While the common law will con-
sider whether the parties had independent counsel at the time of the execution of the agreement to
determine voluntariness, nothing in section six of the Act makes the absence or presence of indepen-
dent legal counsel a condition regarding the unenforceability of a premarital agreement. See UNt¢.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 377. However, the Act concedes that lack of
independent legal counsel may be a factor in determining whether the conditions as stated in section
six existed. Id.
80. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6, 9B U.L.A. at 376.
81. Atwood, supra note 29, at 144.
82. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. at 376. See Atwood, supra note 29, at
144.
83. UNIw. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a), 9B U.L.A. at 376. Under the traditional common
law approach, the burden of proof rested upon the party desiring to uphold the premarital agreement.
See Brod, supra note 33, at 262-63 (stating that the spouse seeking to enforce the premarital
agreement has the burden of proving that the execution of the agreement was voluntary and with
knowledge).
84. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, The Uniform Premarital Agreements Act and the Reality of Premari-
tal Agreements in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 544-45 (1997). See, e.g., Lebeck v. Lebeck, 881 P.2d
727, 733 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that "[t]he Uniform Premarital Agreements Act has altered
these tests by placing the burden solely on the opponent of the agreement, with no shift being made for
an agreement being 'unfair on its face."'); Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 616 (N.C. Ct. App.
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Once the burden of proof has been established, to find a premarital
agreement enforceable the first element to determine is whether the
agreement was executed voluntarily. 85 The U.P.A.A.'s voluntariness
requirement invalidates agreements that were gained through fraud or
duress, with Section 6 supporting a broad interpretation of the volun-
tariness requirement. 86 Specifically, the drafters of the U.P.A.A. were
concerned with situations where one spouse would "spring" a premari-
tal agreement upon the other spouse hours before the wedding.8 7 How-
ever, the modern rule promotes the idea that prospective spouses have
the capacity to bargain with each other at any time in order to structure
the property aspects of their relationship. 88 Regardless, the court will
begin its inquiry into voluntariness by reviewing the premarital agree-
ment for fraud, duress, or sharp dealing. 89
The second element to examine in determining enforceability is
whether the premarital agreement was unconscionable at the time it was
executed. 90 To render a premarital agreement unenforceable, the oppos-
ing party must show that he or she did not receive a fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party, that
he or she did not voluntarily and expressly waive the right to disclosure,
and that he or she did not have, or could not reasonably have had,
adequate knowledge of the other's property or obligations. 9 1 Under
1989) (finding that the party claiming the invalidity of the agreement has the burden of proof).
85. See UNitF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(l), 9B U.L.A. at 376. The conditions stated
under subsection (a) correspond with the statutory law of most jurisdictions. Id. § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at
376.
86. Brandt, supra note 84, at 546. The voluntariness requirement also invalidates agreements
where conduct leading to the execution of an agreement does not equal fraud or duress. Id. By using
the term "voluntary" rather than expressly requiring fraud, duress or misrepresentation, the Act
contemplates conduct relevant to the voluntariness of a premarital agreement. Id. After summarizing
the standards for the enforcement of premarital agreements, the drafters stated that "[i]n each of
these situations, it should be underscored that execution must have been voluntary." Id.
87. Brandt, supra note 84, at 546-47.
88. J. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now Enforceable, Unless. ... 21 Hous. L. REv.
757, 772 (1984). Interestingly, courts that determine the enforceability of a premarital agreement
under the Act have been consistently ruling that an agreement is voluntary even where the agreement
was signed days or hours before the wedding, noting that while canceling the wedding may be embar-
rassing, there is no obligation on either party to go through with the ceremony. See, e.g., In re Mar-
riage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 317-18 (Iowa 1996) (finding that a premarital agreement was
signed voluntarily even though the wife signed the agreement less than 24 hours before the wedding,
and the husband acknowledged minutes before she signed that he, and not just his accountants, wanted
the agreement, contrary to what she had previously been told); Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 618
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the wife signed the premarital agreement voluntarily, although the
agreement had been presented to her the night before the wedding.
89. Brandt, supra note 84, at 548.
90. See UNIF. PREMARrTAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. at 376. This diverges greatly
from the common law approach to unconscionability, where the court may examine a premarital
agreement to determine if it is unconscionable at the time of dissolution. See Younger, supra note 42,
at 1082.
91. UNwt. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2)(i)-(iii), 9B U.L.A. at 376. Permitting express
written waivers of disclosure is a comprehensive exception to the disclosure requirements emerging in
many state courts. See Brandt, supra note 84, at 551. Under the Act, a premarital agreement would
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Section 6, a premarital agreement is valid and enforceable as long as it
was not unconscionable at the time of execution. 92
Finally, the U.P.A.A. allows a narrow escape clause for agreements
that eliminate or modify spousal support. 93 Section 6 contains a provi-
sion that limits a premarital agreement which modifies or eliminates
spousal support to such an extent that it would cause one party to be
eligible "for support under a program of public assistance at the time of
separation or marital dissolution." 94
The U.P.A.A. has not introduced a standard that is foreign to
common law. 95 Like the common law, the U.P.A.A. examines whether
the negotiations between the parties included overreaching, concealing
assets or sharp dealing, and works to ensure that marital partners deal
fairly with each other.96 The U.P.A.A.'s purpose was to provide a model
statute to govern premarital agreements and to regulate certainty as to
the enforceability of the agreement, thereby creating uniformity among
the states. 97 However, the exclusion of an inquiry into the unconsciona-
bility of a premarital agreement at the time of enforcement has prompt-
ed several adopting states to mitigate seemingly harsh standards of
unconscionability under the U.P.A.A.98 North Dakota is among those
states who have diverged from the uniform version by its inclusion of a
section which allows the court to refuse to enforce all or part of a pre-
marital agreement if the court finds that enforcement "would be clearly
unconscionable." 99 Courts that have examined premarital agreements
be enforceable even where one party failed to disclose their financial information and the other party
had no independent knowledge. See Brod, supra note 33, at 276. Furthermore, the agreement could
still be enforceable where there was no disclosure and no waiver if the challenging party should have
known of the other's financial circumstances. See id. at 277. According to Brod, the result is that
there is no unconscionability defense at all. Id. at 278.
92. See Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding that "[p]arties should be
free to execute agreements as they see fit and whether they are 'fair' is not material to their
validity").
93. U~rIn. PREMARrTAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
94. Id. This provision departs from the Act's general approach to unconscionability by looking at
the circumstances of the parties at the time of enforcement rather than at the time of execution of the
agreement. See Brandt, supra note 84, at 551-52. Critics denounce the "public assistance test" by
pointing out that under the common law a provision in a premarital agreement that provided no spousal
support would not be enforced if one spouse showed that he or she had "no other reasonable source of
support." See Atwood, supra note 29, at 147-48. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Purcell, 783 P.2d 1038,
1039 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a provision in a premarital agreement that eliminated spousal
support was not enforceable as the wife was without reasonable support at the time of dissolution).
Under the Act the spouse would have to prove eligibility for public assistance. See Atwood, supra
note 29, at 148.
95. See UNa:. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT AT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 377.
96. See id.
97. Brod, supra note 33, at 275.
98. See Atwood, supra note 29, at 148.
99. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (1997) which states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, if a court finds that the enforcement
of a premarital agreement would be clearly unconscionable, the court may refuse to
enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the unconscion
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under the U.P.A.A. have been stringently enforcing these contracts, as
they are strictly limited to the conditions of voluntariness and unconscio-
nability or knowledge.' 00
However, while the intention of the U.P.A.A. was to provide certain-
ty as to the enforcement of premarital agreements and to create unifor-
mity, states that have adopted the U.P.A.A. are also free to modify the
provisions, thereby ensuring that individual states could reach different
results and create uncertainty. 101 In Chiles v. Chiles,102 for example, the
Texas Court of Appeals concluded that a premarital agreement was valid
and enforceable even though a jury had found the agreement to be
unfair to the wife. 103 The court expressed that the wife had the burden
of proving that the agreement was either not executed voluntarily or that
the agreement was unconscionable at the time of execution. 104 The
Texas Court of Appeals found that the wife was not able to satisfy her
burden of proof in showing that she was not provided with a reasonable
disclosure of the husband's assets, that she did not waive her right to
disclosure, and that she did not have adequate knowledge of the hus-
band's assets before execution of the contract. 105 The court stated that a
jury's finding that the agreement was unfair to the wife was immaterial
to its validity, as "[p]arties should be free to execute agreements as they
see fit. ' ' 106
However, in Penhallow .v. Penhallow,107 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court concluded that a premarital agreement was enforceable even
though it found the agreement to be unconscionable.108 Rhode Island's
version of the U.P.A.A. regarding enforcement varied from the Uniform
Act by stating that the party challenging the agreement has the burden to
prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily and that the
agreement was not unconscionable at the time of execution. 109 In this
able provisions, or limit the application of an unconscionable provision to avoid an
unconscionable result.
100. UNIe. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(a)(l), (2), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
101. Brod, supra note 33, at 275.
102. 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1989).
103. Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App. 1989).
104. Id. (emphasis added)
105. Id. In its determination that the agreement was executed voluntarily and was not uncon-
scionable as the wife had adequate knowledge of the husband's assets, the court noted that the wife
had independent legal counsel. Id.
106. Id.
107. 649 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 1994).
108. Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1021-22 (R.I. 1994).
109. Id. at 1021 (emphasis added). The pertinent text of Rhode Island's UNIFORM PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT regarding enforcement states:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is
sought proves that:
(1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; and
(2) The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before
execution of the agreement, that party;
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instance, the husband challenged the enforcement of a premarital
agreement and the trial court invalidated the agreement, concluding that
the contract was unconscionable.llO However, the Supreme Court found
that since the husband had signed the premarital agreement voluntarily,
he could not meet the burden of proving all of the elements required
under the statute.1 11 Consequently, the court concluded that the
premarital agreement was enforceable. 11 2 The result in this case would
have been different if it would have been governed by the provisions
established under the U.P.A.A.113 Under the U.P.A.A., if the husband
had been able to meet the burden of proof that the agreement was
unconscionable, it would not have been enforceable.l 1 4
The remaining sections of the U.P.A.A. are more tangential and
deal with the enforcement of a premarital agreement if the marriage is
determined to be void, 115 the statute of limitations applicable to a claim
for relief under a premarital agreement,11 6 and the application and
construction of the Act with respect to the states enacting it.117
With the enactment of the U.P.A.A., premarital agreements have
become standardized."l 8 The courts now treat the agreements as ordi-
nary contracts and they are far more willing to enforce premarital
agreements than ever before. 119 Accordingly, under the U.P.A.A., courts
are strictly upholding premarital agreements, since it is difficult to
overcome the burden of proof required to establish unconscionability.1 20
As such, the North Dakota Supreme Court treated the premarital agree-
(i) Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure
of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the
disclosures provided; and
(iii) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge
of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
(b) The burden of proof as to each of the elements required in order to have a
premarital agreement held to be unenforceable shall be on the party seeking to have
the agreement declared unenforceable and must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6(a), (b) (1996).
The court in Penhallow observed that the party seeking to have a premarital agreement
declared unenforceable must meet a heavy burden. 649 A.2d at 1021. The court went on to state,
however, that the legislative intent was to preserve the validity of premarital agreements by requiring
the party challenging the enforcement of the agreement to bear the burden of proving all of the
conditions provided under the statute. Id.
110. Penhallow, 649 A.2d at 1017-18.
111. Id. at 1021-22.
112. Id. at 1022.
113. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(a)(1), (2), 9B U.L.A. at 376 (1987).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 7, 9B U.L.A. at 378.
116. Id. § 8, 9B U.L.A. at 379.
117. Id. § 9, 9B U.L.A. at 379.
118. Marston, supra note 30, at 899.
119. Id.
120. Ladden & Franco, supra note 34, at 275.
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ment as a contract and applied the dual analysis of procedural and
substantive unconscionability as established by the U.P.A.A.121
III. ANALYSIS
Writing for a unanimous bench, Justice Meschke addressed three
issues relating to the premarital agreement: First, whether under North
Dakota's Premarital Agreement Act, the agreement between Emanuel
and Lavilla was unenforceable since Lavilla lacked independent legal
representation; second, whether the agreement was void due to construc-
tive fraud, since Lavilla claimed that Emanuel failed to fulfill his "any-
way" promise to her; and third, whether the agreement was uncon-
scionable, which would render it void.122
In determining whether the premarital agreement was enforceable,
the court looked to North Dakota Century Code Section 14-03.1, North
Dakota's version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.123 The Uni-
121. See generally In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90, 97-101 (N.D. 1997).
122. Id. at 95-102. The court also addressed the issue of whether Lavilla's care for Emanuel dur-
ing his illnesses was so extraordinary as to find an implied or express agreement for compensation of
extraordinary services. Id. at 94. The general rule is that services performed by a family member are
gratuitous and compensation is not intended. Id. The court determined that in certain situations, where
there has been a showing of particularly extraordinary service, compensation should be granted. Id.
at 94-95. The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded as there existed a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Lavilla's service to Emanuel qualified for compensation. Id. at 95. A
second issue addressed by the court was the estate distribution and whether Lavilla was entitled to an
intestate share of Emanuel's estate as his surviving spouse. Id. at 93. The court asserted that Lavilla
may or may not be entitled to one-half of Emanuel's estate through the laws of intestacy, depending on
whether the premarital agreements are found to be enforceable or unconscionable. Id. at 102. The
court determined that the trial court erred in allowing the estate distribution as the issue of the agree-
ments needed to be determined first. Id. at 101. Only after the trial court has determined the enforce-
ability of the agreements can it order the estate distribution. Id. However, for the purposes of this law
review article, these issues will not be further addressed.
123. Id. at 96. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act authorizes prospective spouses to con-
tract the rights and obligations of each of the parties regarding the property of either or both of them
and the disposition of property upon death and the making of a will or other arrangement to carry out
the provisions of the agreement. Id. See N.D.CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-03 (1997) which states:
1. Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:
a. The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or
both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;
b. The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend,
assign, create a security in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage
and control property;
c. The disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death or the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
d. The modification or elimination of spousal support.
e. The making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the
agreement;
f. The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance
policy;
g. The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement;
h. Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of
public policy or a statute imposing criminal penalty.
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form Premarital Agreement Act provides that a premarital agreement is
not enforceable if the agreement was not executed voluntarily or if the
agreement is unconscionable. 124 Lavilla argued that because of her lack
of independent counsel, her signing of the agreement was not voluntary
and was unconscionable as a matter of law. 125 The Act provides that a
court may refuse to enforce a premarital agreement, either in part or in
whole, if the court finds that agreement unconscionable. 126 However, the
enforceability of premarital agreements is a matter of first impression in
North Dakota.127 Therefore, the court implemented a dual analysis often
used in evaluating commercial contracts for unconscionability: pro-
cedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. 12
8
2. The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital
agreement.
124. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 96. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06 (1997) regarding the enforce-
ment of the agreements. This section states:
1. A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement
is sought proves that:
a. That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
b. The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of
the agreement, that party:
(1) Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party;
(2) Did not voluntarily sign a document expressly waiving any right to disclosure of
the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosures
provided; and
(3) Did not have notice of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
2. If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and
that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other
party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
3. An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement is for decision by the court as
a matter of law.
Id.
125. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 96. See Brief for Appellant at 25, In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90
(N.D. 1997) (No. 960177).
126. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 96. See N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03.1-07 (1997), which states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, if a court finds that the enforcement
of a premarital agreement would be clearly unconscionable, the court may refuse to
enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the
unconscionable provisions, or limit the application of an unconscionable provision to
avoid an unconscionable result.
127. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 96.
128. Id. The court relied on its earlier decision in Construction Assoc. v. Fargo Water Equip.,
446 N.W.2d 237, 241 (N.D. 1989), where it defined procedural unconscionability as unfair surprise,
oppression, and inequality of bargaining power, and defined substantive unconscionability as harsh-
ness or one-sidedness. Id. The court stated that it used this dual analysis at the appellant's suggestion.
Id. However, the interpretation of premarital agreements has long been based on the contract prin-
ciples of procedural and substantive fairness in determining enforceability. See Brod, supra note 33,
at 254.
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A. PROCEDURAL ENFORCEABILITY
Lavilla argued that the premarital agreements were procedurally
defective because she did not have independent legal representation
when she signed. 129 Lavilla asserted that she could not have signed
voluntarily unless she fully understood her rights, which were dependent
upon whether she received adequate representation.1 30 Under North
Dakota's Premarital Agreement Act, an agreement is not enforceable if
the disadvantaged spouse did not execute it voluntarily. 131 The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the trial court had failed to recognize
the dispute regarding whether Lavilla was adequately advised to seek
counsel, and its resulting impact upon the voluntariness of her
signing. 132
The court noted that North Dakota courts have never ruled on
whether a premarital agreement can be void due to lack of counsel. 133
The court determined that a lack of opportunity to consult with indepen-
dent counsel may be a factor in a fiduciary relationship.134 The court
further reasoned that an agreement to marry can create a fiduciary
relationship if the individuals do not deal at arm's length.135 The court
129. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97.
130. Id. The children argued that Lavilla had plenty of time to consult with independent counsel
since it was close to nine months between the time the documents were prepared and sent out and
when Lavilla and Emanuel signed them. Id. The children also point to Lavilla's deposition testimony
where she agreed: (1) she read the marriage agreement before signing; (2) she understood the effect
of the document; (3) she was asked if she understood the documents by the attorney; (4) she was
asked if she had any questions by the attorney; (5) she didn't ask any questions; (6) she was asked if
she wanted to sign the document; and (7) she signed the document. Brief for Appellees at 15-16, In re
Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997) (No. 960177).
131. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(1) (1997) (determining when a
premarital agreement will not be held enforceable).
132. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97.
133. Id. The court looked to other states to determine how other jurisdictions interpreted this
issue. Id. The court stated that no state requires independent counsel in order to make an agreement
valid. Id. (citing Randolph v. Randolph, 937 W.W.2d 815, 822 (Tenn. 1996)). However, many states
require at least an opportunity to consult with independent counsel, while not requiring them to actually
consult in order to make the agreement valid. Id. (citing McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259,
266 (Minn. 1989) (ruling that the absence or presence of counsel is treated as a factor in determining
the voluntariness of an agreement)). See generally Robert Roy, Annotation, Enforceability of Premari-
tal Agreements Governing Support or Property Rights upon Divorce or Separation as Affected by
Circumstances Surrounding Execution-Modem Status, 53 A.L.R.4th 85 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
134. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 98. The court interpreted "fiduciary relationship" as "something ap-
proximating business, agency, professional relationship, or family tie impelling or inducing the trusting
party to relax the care and vigilance he [or she] would ordinarily exercise." Id. (citing Asleson v.
West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N.D. 1981)). A fiduciary relationship develops when
someone has a duty to act for, or advise, another person upon matters within the scope of the relation-
ship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979). Most states hold engaged couples to be in
a fiduciary relationship and hold the parties to the highest standards of good faith and fair dealing
when contracting a premarital agreement. Brod, supra note 33, at 262.
135. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 98.
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discussed that parties who contract about marriage often do not have
equal bargaining power and sophistication.1
36
The court agreed that lack of adequate legal advice to a prospective
spouse is a significant factor in determining whether a premarital agree-
ment is voluntary.' 37 Further, the court stated that adequate legal
representation is often the best evidence that a premarital agreement was
signed voluntarily.1 38  In this case, the court found that there was
conflicting evidence regarding whether Lavilla was ever actually advised
to obtain legal counsel.139 Emanuel's attorney testified that he advised
Lavilla to obtain independent counsel, while Lavilla testified that she
believed that Emanuel's attorney was also acting as her attorney.140 As
such, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Lavilla was advised by Emanuel's attorney about potential
conflicts of interest, her need to obtain independent counsel, and her
consent to dual representation.' 4 ' Thus, summary judgment was
precluded.142
Lavilla also argued that Emanuel's failure to keep his promise to
take care of her "anyway" resulted in him benefiting disproportionately
from the relationship, thus amounting to constructive fraud.
14 3
Emanuel's children argued that any amendment to a premarital agree-
ment must be in writing.144 They also contended that their father did not
have any intent to deceive Lavilla with his promise to take care of her
outside of the marital agreement, and therefore, this promise could not
be considered fraud. 145
The court expressed that parol or extrinsic evidence can be used to
interpret a premarital agreement to determine whether any relevant and
essential elements are missing due to fraud or mistake.146 Consequen-
136. Id. The court looked to its earlier decisions in Weber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D.
1996), and Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D. 1994), to discuss its concern that
property settlements in divorce [or death] cases must be examined carefully for unconscionability, as
the law should not permit one marital partner to take advantage of the other. Id.
137. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 98.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 98-99. See also NoRm DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (detailing an
attorney's duty in his/her dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel).
141. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 90.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 97.
144. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-05 (1997) (stating that "[a]fter marriage, a premarital
agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties.")
145. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 99.
146. Id. See Mau v. Schwan, 460 N.W.2d 131, 134 (N.D. 1990) (summarizing the relevant
principles for deciding the reformation of a contract). In Mau, the court stated that parole evidence of
an alleged mistake used as the basis for the modification of a written instrument must be clear, satisfac-
tory and specific, and any reformation of a contract must be determined upon its own particular facts
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tially, the circumstances of an unfulfilled oral promise would be addi-
tional evidence regarding whether the premarital agreements were
voluntary.147 The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded
since the issue of constructive fraud went to the voluntariness of the
premarital agreements.148
B. SUBSTANTIVE ENFORCEABILITY
The court noted that even where a premarital agreement is volun-
tarily obtained, it still may be unconscionable and unenforceable due to
its substantive effect.149 Lavilla argued that the agreements were uncon-
scionable because of their harshness since her share of the distribution of
Emanuel's estate totaled less than thirteen percent of the entire estate, an
insignificant amount considering the length of time Lavilla and Emanuel
were married and the extent of Lavilla's care when Emanuel was ill.150
Lavilla also argued that the premarital agreements were void as to
public policy. 15 1 At the time of trial, Lavilla was sixty-four years old
with little education or training and she contended that under her present
circumstances she would be forced to go on public assistance. 152 In
North Dakota, if a premarital agreement could potentially cause one
party to be eligible for public assistance at the end of the relationship,
the court may require the other party to provide the necessary
support.153
Emanuel's children argued that this provision of the statute only
applied to separation or divorce, not death, and therefore it was
inapplicable in this instance.15 4 However, the court determined that
and set of circumstances. Id. (quoting Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143, 150 (N.D. 1980)).
147. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 99. The court based its determination on NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
§ 9-03-08(2) (1987), which states that fraud by a contracting party who makes a "positive assertion, in
a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true though he
believes it to be true." Id. (quoting § 9-03-08(2)). See also Bourgois v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 466
N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (N.D. 1991) (finding a statutory claim based on negligent misrepresentation and
also defining constructive fraud as any breach of a duty which is ordinarily owed because of a
fiduciary relationship).
148. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 99.
149. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(3) (1997) (stating that an issue of unconscion-
ability of a premarital agreement is a matter of law).
150. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 99.
151. Id. at 100.
152. Id. Lavilla also had a back injury which prevented her from working at many jobs that she
would have been qualified for. See Brief for Appellant at 30-31, In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90
(N.D. 1997) (No. 960177).
153. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 100. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(2) which states:
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and that
modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support
under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a
court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other party to provide
support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
154. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 100.
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under the Prefatory Note to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, the
Act also applies in a case where a spouse dies.155 In light of the issue of
whether Lavilla would be forced to go onto public assistance due to the
constraints of her financial circumstances, the court determined that
summary judgment was precluded because it was a factual issue.156 The
court remanded the issue of enforceability of the agreements back to the
trial court to determine whether Lavilla procedurally executed the
premarital agreements voluntarily and whether in their substantive
application they are unconscionable.1 57
IV. IMPACT
The full impact has yet to be realized in determining the enforce-
ability and unconscionability of premarital agreements in North Dakota.
However, with the decision in Lutz, the North Dakota Supreme Court did
establish that it would interpret premarital contracts under the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act using procedural and substantive
unconscionability. 158 The court seemed to rely heavily upon the fact
that Lavilla did not have independent counsel in determining the
voluntariness of the agreement. 159 However, the U.P.A.A. specifies that
the absence of independent counsel is not a condition in determining the
enforceability of a premarital agreement.160
155. Id. The text of the Prefatory Note is almost identical to N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(2)
and states:
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support, and that
modification or elimination would cause a [spouse] to be eligible for support under a
program of public assistance at the time of separation, marital dissolution, or death, a
court is authorized to order the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to
avoid that eligibility.
156. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 100. The court noted that while unconscionability of a premarital agree-
ment is a matter of law to be decided by the court, a conclusion of unconscionability turns on factual
findings. Id.
157. Id. at 101.
158. Id. at 97-101. The court's decision to interpret premarital agreements using the commercial
contract principles of procedural and substantive fairness is in accordance with the other states that
have enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, and also with states that define premarital
agreements by statute or common law. See Brod, supra note 33, at 254.
159. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97-98. The absence or presence of independent counsel has been used
by many courts as a factor in determining whether an agreement was entered into voluntarily. Id. at
97. Many states also observe that voluntariness has the elements of normal contract law doctrines of
duress and undue influence. See Brod, supra note 33, at 257. Because prospective spouses are con-
sidered to be in a fiduciary relationship, premarital contracts are held to the highest standards of good
faith and fair dealing, leading most courts to establish that an agreement is only enforceable if entered
into voluntarily. Id.
160. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987). Lavilla's argument
rested upon the fact that she did not have independent legal counsel at the time the agreement was
executed. See Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97. However, under the Act, whether Lavilla had independent
counsel is not a condition of voluntariness. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B
U.L.A. at 376. Thus, the court seemed to have incorrectly placed too much emphasis upon this fact.
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In addressing whether Lavilla executed the agreement with knowl-
edge, the court again placed a heavy emphasis upon the fact that Lavilla
did not have independent counsel.161 North Dakota's version of the Uni-
form Premarital Agreement Act requires that there be fair and reasona-
ble disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the parties in
order to enforce a premarital agreement.162 Lavilla did receive a fair and
reasonable disclosure before executing the agreement.163 Lavilla re-
viewed a disclosure of Emanuel's assets and obligations, prior to the
execution of the premarital agreement, when she and Emanuel met with
Emanuel's attorney. 164 Pursuant to the statute, it would be very difficult
to show that Lavilla did not receive a fair and reasonable disclosure.165
The court in this instance focused too heavily upon Lavilla's lack of
independent counsel in its examination of the voluntariness and knowl-
edge components, since all of the elements had been met under the
statute. 166 By placing the focus upon Lavilla's lack of independent coun-
sel, the court seemingly appears to have deferred to the common law in
its interpretation of premarital agreements rather than relying on case
law decided under the U.P.A.A.167
See generally Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97-98. Furthermore, the court, in its analysis of a lack of
independent counsel in determining voluntariness, cites almost exclusively to case law from
non-Uniform Premarital Agreement Act states. See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d
259, 266 (Minn. 1989) (stating that the wife had the opportunity to consult with independent counsel in
its enforcement of the premarital agreement); Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tenn.
1996) (holding that while independent counsel is not a requirement in determining the validity of an
agreement, it is a factor in assessing voluntariness); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W.Va. 1985)
(finding that while independent counsel is not a requirement for validity, both parties must have had
the opportunity to consult with independent counsel).
161. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97.
162. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(b)(1) (1997). The UNIFORM PREMARIrAL AGREEMENT
ACT also provides that an agreement is unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if the party did
not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial
obligations of the other party. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
163. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92. The requirements listed under the Act do not require full disclo-
sure, and in fact do not require disclosure at all if the other party knew or should have known of the
other's assets and obligations. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
Even if Lavilla had not been presented with a full disclosure, because she and Emanuel lived together
before they were married, it would be a very heavy burden for Lavilla to prove that she did not have
knowledge regarding Emanuel's assets and obligations when she signed the agreement. See id.
164. See Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92.
165. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(l)(b)(1). Emanuel's children supported their contention
that Lavilla did receive a fair and reasonable disclosure by arguing that Lavilla had previously
acknowledged that she had been provided with financial information prior to the execution of the
premarital agreement, that she was informed as to the extent of property owned by Emanuel, and that
nothing in the financial information surprised her. See Brief for Appellees at 19-20, In re Estate of
Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997) (No. 960177).
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(1)(b). The Act does not establish any criteria for establish-
ing unconscionability outside of the elements listed regarding disclosure of property and obligations by
the parties. See id. Thus, the agreement satisfied all of the requirements listed under the statute be-
cause Lavilla received a full disclosure, she did not waive her right to disclosure, and she knew or
should have know about Emanuel's assets and obligations. See Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 92.
167. See generally Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 97-99.
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Lavilla's strongest claim was that the premarital agreement was sub-
stantively unfair since she would be forced to go on public assistance. 168
The court examined this claim since the Act specifies that an agreement
that would force one party to go on public assistance is unconscionable
and the court can order the other party to provide the necessary
support.169 It remains to be decided whether Lavilla qualifies for public
assistance, and consequently if the agreement will be held unenforceable
due to this finding. 17
0
However, the court did not determine whether and in what instance
it would turn to § 14-03.1-07, which would allow the court to invalidate
a premarital agreement if it found the agreement to be clearly
unconscionable.1 71 This Section allows the court broad discretion in
determining when it will render a premarital agreement uncon-
scionable. 172 While the court alluded to the fact that it has this discretion-
ary power, it offered no illustration as to when and why it would be
used.173 Thus, the court has yet to decide in which instance this section
of the statute is applicable.
168. See generally id. at 99-101.
169. Id. North Dakota's version of the UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT does not allow for
the enforcement of a premarital agreement where a provision in the agreement would cause one of
the parties to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or
divorce. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(2). See also UNIF. PREMArrAL AGREEMENT ACT, Pre-
fatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 370 (1987) (stating that a premarital agreement will not be enforced where the
provisions of the agreement could cause one party to be eligible for public assistance at the time of
separation, divorce or death).
170. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 100-01.
171. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (1997), which states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, if a court finds that the enforcement
of a premarital agreement would be clearly unconscionable, the court may refuse to
enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the
unconscionable provisions, or limit the application of an unconscionable provision to
avoid an unconscionable result.
172. Id. This broad discretion in determining that an agreement is unconscionable seemingly con-
tradicts the court's position that the purpose of the Act is to allow parties contractual autonomy. See
Atwood, supra note 29, at 153-54.
173. Lutz, 563 N.w.2d at 101.
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V. CONCLUSION
With Lutz, the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the pattern es-
tablished by other states that have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act. The North Dakota courts will interpret premarital agreements
as ordinary contracts, rendering them unenforceable if there should be a
finding of either procedural or substantive unconscionability.
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